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I refer to the orders of denial of the right to inspect in 
part and quashing of the subpoena in part as affecting the 
substantial rights of a party. Clearly they do, because one 
of the very questions at issue is whether the council acted 
arbitrarily, and necessarily involved therein were the surveys 
made and the method of making them. Hence, insofar as 
plaintiff was deprived of his right to take the deposition and 
inspect the surveys, accepting the names and identity of the 
employers furnishing data and the rate of compensation of 
particular employees, the trial court was in error. It is not 
necessary to decide whether it was necessary for plaintiff 
to take exception to the orders because the judgment should 
be reversed on the grounds heretofore mentioned. 
[L. A. No. 21347. In Bank. Mar. 10, 1953.] 
SEVEN UP BOTTLING COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES 
INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. GROCERY DRIVERS 
UNION LOCAL 848 (an Unincorporated Association) 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Scope and Extent of Review-Pleadings.-Where pro-
ceedings on a preliminary injunction are separate from those 
leading to a judgment of dismissal on ground that complaint 
does not state a cause of action, and an appeal is taken only 
from such judgment, the court on appeal will not consider 
affidavits presented in connection with such injunction but 
will consider only the complaint. 
[2] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Law-Activities Prohibited.-Al-
leged activities of defendant labor organizations consisting 
of concerted interference with plaintiff-employer's business 
arising out of a controversy between defendants and another 
labor organization, which had entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with plaintiff, as to which of these organ-
izations should have exclusive right to bargain collectively 
with plaintiff, fall within terms of Jurisdictional Strike Act. 
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120.) 
[3] Id.-Pleading.-In employer's complaint against labor organ-
izations for violation of Jurisdictional Strike Act, an infer-
ence that the cause of defendants' concerted activities or 
picketing was a dispute between them and another labor or-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 966; [2, 7, 9] 
Labor, §21; [3] Labor, §27; [4,6] Labor, §23; [5] Labor, §25; 
[8] Labor, § 20a. 
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ganization, which had entered into a collective bargaining 
agreement with plaintiff, may reasonably be drawn from an 
allegation that "Thereby, a controversy has arisen between the 
defendants" and such other labor organization "as to which 
of them has or should have the exclusive right to have its 
members perform work for the plaintiff," since use of the 
word "thereby" in such quotation does not mean that there 
was no dispute between defendants and the other labor or-
ganization before such activities were launched. 
[4] Id.-Picketing.-Peaceful picketing is identified with freedom 
of speech or a means by which the pickets communicate to 
others the existence of a labor controversy, though such identi-
fication does not free picketing from all restraint. 
[5] !d.-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief against picketing is 
available where the object sought to be achieved or the means 
used to achieve it are unlawful. 
[6] Id.-Picketing.-The clear and present danger test as applied 
in the ordinary free speech cases is not necessarily controlling 
in determining whether picketing should be restrained. 
[7] !d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act.-The clear and present danger 
test is satisfied where the concerted activities of defendant 
labor organizations will have the immediate result of thwart-
ing the main purpose of the Jurisdictional Strike Act to pro-
tect an employer against interferencP with his business and 
the public from disturbances resulting from a dispute between 
unions as to which should have the right to bargain collectively 
with the employer. 
[8] !d.-Economic Pressure Activities.-The rights of employers 
and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to com-
pete with others for a share in the products of industry are 
subject to modification or qualification in the interests of the 
society in which they exist. 
[9] Id.- Jurisdictional Strike Act- Validity.- Jurisdictional 
Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) is valid, it being within 
the function of the Legislature to declare, as the policy of this 
state, that an employer's business shall not be interfered with 
or the public welfare disrupted by reason of an argument 
between two or more unions as to which shall be chosen to 
represent his employees. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Archie D. Mitchell, .Judge.'~ Reversed. 
[4] Lawful or proper labor purpose as condition of right of 
rwaceful picketing, note, 174 A.L.R. 593. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. 
Supp, (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 223 et seq. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil. 
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CARTER, J.-By its complaint in this action plaintiff 
sought injunctive relief and damages. Following the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction, the case was called for 
trial, at which time defendants' objection to the introduc-
tion of any evidence on the ground that the complaint did 
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was 
sustained, and the court gave judgment that plaintiff recover 
nothing, but continued the preliminary injunction in force 
pending appeal. This appeal is by plaintiff from that judg-
ment. There is no appeal from the order granting the in-
junction. There was a dispute as to whether the appeal was 
from the order sustaining the objection to the evidence, or 
from the judgment, but that was resolved in favor of the 
latter appeal. (Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers 
Union, 97 Cal.App.2d 623 [218 P.2d 41] .) 
[1] Preliminarily it should be observed that defendants 
assert that some affidavits presented in connection with the 
preliminary injunction proceedings should be considered on 
this appeal as supplementing and explaining the complaint, 
because they were brought here by plaintiff as a part of the 
"clerk's transcript." The judgment from which the appeal 
is taken, however, is the same as one of dismissal after de-
murrer sustained. No appeal was taken by defendants from 
the order granting the preliminary injunction, or from the 
judgment and, of course, plaintiff is not objecting to the 
order. The primary issue presented for decision in the court 
below and here is the validity of California's Jurisdictional 
Strike Law, infra. The court, in rendering its judgment, 
did not purport to pass upon anything but the sufficiency 
of the complaint. The proceedings on the preliminary in-
junction were separate from those leading to the judgment. 
Hence we deem it proper to consider only the complaint, 
and such cases as Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal.App.2d 363 [172 
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P.2d 945], Mason v. Drug, Inc., 31 Cal.App.2d 697 [88 P.2d 
929], and Fox Chicago R. Corp. v. Zukor's Dresses, Inc., 50 
Cal.App.2d 129 [122 P.2d 705], relied upon by defendants, 
are not controlling. 
The complaint is in four counts. Plaintiff is a corporation 
engaged in the business of bottling and distributing bever-
ages. Most of defendants are labor unions, referred to as 
teamsters' unions, and are labor organizations existing for 
the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, hours and working conditions. Other 
defendants are officers or agents of the unions. All defend-
ants have acted in "concert" in the activities stated in the 
complaint. Plaintiff employs persons in its business who 
were, in March, 1949, members of Seven Up Employees As-
sociation, hereafter referred to as the association, an unin-
corporated labor organization of employees existing for the 
usual purposes of such groups. The association is not financed, 
dominated or controlled in any respect by plaintiff. In March, 
1949, plaintiff .and the association entered into a collective 
bargaining agreement prescribing the wage rate, working con-
ditions, etc., of plaintiff's employees, which is still in effect. 
Since June, 1949, defendants have been carrying on concerted 
''economic activities'' to compel plaintiff to recognize de-
fendant unions as the collective bargaining agents of its em-
ployees, and a controversy has arisen between defendants and 
the association as to which should represent plaintiff's em-
ployees. The activities consist of picketing by defendants of re-
tail food markets where plaintiff's products are sold, resulting 
in the refusal of those markets to buy or sell plaintiff's prod-
ucts. Plaintiff has no dispute or controversy with any of its 
employees with regard to wages, hours or working conditions. 
All of the foregoing appears from the first count in the 
complaint. In addition it is charged that plaintiff has suffered 
damages of over $2,000 because of defendants' acts and that 
the damage remedy is inadequate. The second, third and 
fourth counts reallege the first count. Count two asserts that 
defendants' actions violated the Jurisdictional Strike Law, 
infra; count three, that defendants, by their activities, are 
endeavoring to induce plaintiff and~ its employees to break 
the 1949 collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff 
and the association. Count four alleges that the activities of 
defendants are aimed at compelling plaintiff to recognize de-
fendants as bargaining agents when it would be unlawful 
for plaintiff to do so, for to compel their employees to be-
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long to a certain union would he in violation of sections 921-
fJ23 of the Labor Code and the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A., § 141 et seq.); and that as a re-
sult it has been damaged in the sum of $100,000. 
On this appeal plaintiff rests its case on the Jurisdictional 
Strike Act, infra, public policy, Labor Code, sections 921-923 
and interference with contract relations. 
The JurisdictioMl Strike Act was adopted in 1947 (Stats. 
1947, ch. 1388) by adding sections 1115-1120 to the Labor 
Code. A jurisdictional strike is defined as ''a concerted 
refusal to perform work for an employer or any other con-
certed interference with an employer's operation or busi-
ness, arising out of a controversy between two or more labor 
organizations as to which of them has or should have the 
exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on 
behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a 
controversy between two or more labor organizations as to 
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have 
its members perform work for an employer." (Lab. Code, 
§ 1118.) A labor organization is "any organization or any 
agency or employee representation committee or any local 
unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists for 
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of em-
ployment or conditions of work, which labor organization is 
not found to be financed in whole or in part, interfered with, 
dominated or controlled by the employer." (Id. § 1117.) 
Nothing in the act shall ''interfere with collective bargain-
ing subject to the prohibitions herein set forth, nor to pro-
hibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining a mem-
ber of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any 
other individual to join a labor organization." (I d. § 1119.) 
The jurisdictional strike is "against the public policy" of the 
state and is "unlawful," (I d. § 1115) and any person suffer-
ing injury from a violation of the act is entitled to injunc-
tive relief and damages. (Id., § 1116.) 
In view of the result reached herein it will be necessary 
to consider only the Jurisdictional Strike Law. There is 
no allegation showing that plaintiff was engaged in a bus-
iness affecting interstate commerce and hence the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, supra, has no application. 
[2] It should be clear that the activities of defendants, 
as alleged, fall within the terms of the act (Jurisdictional 
Strike Act). Defendants and the association are labor or-
ganizations and the latter is not financed, interfered with, 
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dominated or controlled by plaintiff. There has been a con-
certed interference by defendants with plaintiff's-employer's 
business. That interference arises out of a controversy be-
tween two or more labor organizations-defendants and the 
association-as to which of them should have the right to 
collectively bargain with plaintiff-employer. The latter fol-
lows from the allegation in the complaint that there was a 
collective bargaining agreement between the association and 
plaintiff, to the former of which plaintiff's employees belong, 
and that agreement controls the labor relations between them. 
Since then defendants have been carrying on concerted eco-
nomic activities (picketing) to compel plaintiff to choose 
defendants as the exclusive bargaining representatives of 
its employees, who are working under the agreement. [3] It 
may reasonably be inferred that the cause of such activity 
was a dispute between defendants and the association, for 
their demands to be exclusive agents would necessarily be 
to replace the association, and it was expressly alleged that: 
'' 'rhereby, a controversy has arisen between the defendants 
and the Seven Up Employees' Association as to which of 
them has or should have the exclusive right to have its mem-
bers perform work for the plaintiff in the job classifications 
above set forth." We do not take the use of "thereby" in 
the above quotation to mean that there was no dispute be-
tween defendants and the association before the activities 
were launched. Implicit in the pleading is the assertion of 
a dispute between defendants and the association which the 
former seek to win by their activities. In addition to the 
above it is alleged that defendants, Grocery Drivers Union 
Local 848, and the association claim bargaining rights on be-
half of plaintiff's employees; that the bargaining agreement 
with the association was in full force and satisfactory to 
the association, and that defendants "knew of the existencE' 
of said contract and of the arrangements between plaintiff 
<md its employees thereunder." 
Defendants' contention of unconstitutionality of the act 
rests on the argument that under the guaranties of freedom 
of speech and of the press the picketing was lawful, and the 
act, therefore, in condemning concerted interference with 
the employer's business, is invalid, because it deprives them 
of the right to engage in lawful coneerted action, that is, 
peaceful picketing; that such activity does not create a "clear 
and present danger'' justifying a restraint on the freedoms 
mentioned, 
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[4] Peaceful picketing has been identified with freedom 
of speech-a means by which the pickets communicate to 
others the existence of a labor controversy. (Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]; Carlson 
v. California, 310 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104]; 
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 [61 
S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855] ; Carpenters & J. Union v. Ritter's 
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143] ; Bakery & 
P. Driver's & Helpers, I.B.T. v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769 [62 S.Ct. 
816, 86 I ... Ed. 1178] ; Hotel&; R. E. Intl. Alliance v. Wisconsin 
Emp. Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437 [62 S.Ct. 706, 86 L.Ed. 
946]; Cafeteria Emp. Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 [64 
S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58] ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [65 
S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430] ; J.11cllay v. Retail A1do. S.L. Union 
No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311 [106 P.2d 373]; Ste1:ner v. Long Beach 
Local No. 128, 19 Cal.2d 676 [123 P.2d 20]; In re Bell, 19 
Cal.2d488 [122 P.2d22] ; MagiU Bros., Inc. v. Building Service 
Intl. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506 [127 P.2d 542]; People v. Dail, 
22 Cal.2d 642 [140 P.2d 828]; Emde v. San Joaquin County 
Central Labor Council, 23 Cal.2d146 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 
916]; James v. illarinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 
160 A.L.R. 900] ; Park & T.I. Corp. v. International etc. of 
Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426]; 
In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ; 
In re Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643 [184 P.2d 892] ; Northwestern 
Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & S.W. Union, 31 Cal.2d 441 [189 P.2d 
277].) It has been pointed out that such identification does 
not free the concerted activity of picketing from all restraint. 
[5] ''And it appears to be settled that injunctive relief 
against picketing is available where the object sought to be 
achieved or the means used to achieve it are unlawful. (See, 
Park & T.I. Corp. v. International etc. Teamsters, supra; 
James v. Marinship Corp., supra; Magill Bros., Inc. v. Build-
ing SeTvice Emp. Intl. Union, supra; Dorchy v. State of 
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 [47 S.Ct. 86,71 LEd. 248]; Mille Wagon 
Driver·s Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, supra [312 U.S. 287 
(85 L.Ed. 836, 61 S.Ct. 552, 132 A.L.R. 1200)]; Carpenters 
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, sup1·a; Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 
315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154] .... 
''The solution of labor problems requires, however, an 
approach with a broader perspective. Although literally, 
and in a strict sense, the objective or means employed in the 
union activity may be unlawful, there still remains the neces-
sity for preserving the general public welfare and the con-
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stitutional guaranties of freedom of speech, press and as-
sembly. The asserted illegality may be merely incidental or of 
only minor importance when weighed against the requirement 
of competition and some measure of equality in the economic 
struggle between the seller and purchaser of services. The 
public interest may tip the scales one way or the other. 
If preventive relief were available in every instance of labor 
activity interfering with the performance by a common car-
rier or other public utility of its duties, or involving some 
unlawful act, no matter how insignificant on the part of the 
person upon whom the economic pressure is exerted, con-
ceivably there would be little left in the way of protection 
for the exercise of the fundamental rig·hts of freedom of 
speech, press and assembly, and organized labor would be at 
a serious if not hopeless disadvantage in our competitive 
economy." (Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & S.W. 
Union, supra, 31 Cal.2d 441, 445.) 
[6] Furthermore, it should be noted that the clear and 
present danger test as applied in the ordinary free speech 
cases is not "necessarily" controlling. (In re Blaney, supra, 
30 Cal.2d 643, 646.) Since the foregoing cases were decided 
the United States Supreme Court has upheld restraints on 
picketing without mentioning clear and present danger. 
(Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 
L.Ed. 985] ; International Bro. of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, 
339 U.S. 470 [70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L.Ed. 995, 13 A.L.R.2d 631] .) 
In a case in the group of recent cases hereinafter discussed, in 
which the test was mentioned, it was set forth as follows: ''The 
Missouri policy against restraints of trade is of long standing 
and is in most respects the same as that which the Federal 
Government has followed for more than half a century. It is 
clearly drawn in an attempt to afford all persons an equal 
opportunity to buy goods. There was clear danger, imminent 
and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants would suc-
ceed in making that policy a dead letter insofar as purchases 
by nonunion men were concerned. Appellants' power with 
that of their allies was irresistible. And it is clear that ap-
pellants were doing more than exercising a right of free 
speech or press. . . . They were exercising their economic 
power together with that of their allies to compel Empire 
to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.'' 
(Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
[69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834] .) [7] Under that view, and 
application of the test, it is clear that defendants' activities 
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he1·e will havP the immediate result of thwarting the main 
purpose of the act to proteet an employer against interference 
with l1iR businm:s and the public from disturbaner,s resulting 
from a dispute bPtwer,n unions as to which should have the 
right to bargain eolleetivr,ly (and all that r,ntails) with the 
employer. 'l'hus it would appear that the test as stated in the 
Uiboney case, s·upm, is here satisfied. 
'l'his brings us then to the question of the extent to which 
the I-'egislature may regulate activities, which have some 
aspects of free speech, in labor controversies, and particularly 
those activities relating to disputes between rival unions, both 
seeking to attain the status of the exclusive bargaining agent 
for an employer's employees. The solution hinges upon the 
recent cases decided by the Unitr,d States Supreme Court. 
[8] First, it should be observed that the basic case applying 
the free speech guaranty to picketing had this to say while 
invoking that guaranty: "It is true that the rights of em-
ployers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and 
to compete with othr,rs for a share in thr, products of industry 
are subject to modification or qualification in the interests 
of thr, society in which they exist. This is but an instance of 
the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest 
open to industrial combatants." (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 
310 U.S. 88, 103.) Similar remarks were made in subsequent 
cases. (Carpenters &: J. Union v. Ritter's Cafe, supra, 315 
U.S. 722; Bakery &: P. Drivers &: Helpers, I.B.T. v. W ohl, 
sttpra, 315 U.S. 769; Hotel&: R.E. Intl. Alliance v. Wisconsin 
Emp. Relations Board, sup1·a, 315 U.S. 437; Thomas v. Collins, 
sup-ra, 323 U.S. 516.) 
Pollowing those expressions the subsequent decisions have 
dealt with various situations. Giboney v. Empire Storage &: 
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834], dealt with 
peaceful picketing by a union in an effort to organize non-
union ice peddlr,rs, in which one ice dealer refused to agree 
not to sell to such peddlers. .A judgment enjoining peaceful 
picketing to compr,l that dealer to make such an agreement 
was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri on the ground 
that to compel the dealer to agree would be in violation of 
Missouri's anti trade restraint act. The Supreme Court of 
the United States upheld the injunction, stating: "Neither 
Thornh1:U v. Alabama, supra, nor Carlson v. California, 310 
U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104], both decided on the 
same clay, supports the contention that conduct otherwise un-
lawful is always immune from state regulation because an 
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integral part of that conduct is carried on by display of 
placards by peaceful picketers. In both these cases this Court 
struck down statutes which banned all dissemination of in-
formation by people adjacent to certain premises, pointing out 
that the statutes were so broad that they could not only be 
utilized to punish conduct plainly illegal but could also he 
applied to ban all truthful publications of the faets of a 
labor controversy. But in the Thornhill opinion, at pp. 108-
104, the Court was careful to point out that it was within the 
province of states 'to set the limits of permissible contest open 
to industrial combatants.' See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. 
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536, 542, 557 
[69 S.Ct. 251, 260, 267, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473] ; 
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relation Board, 315 
U.S. 740, 748-751 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154]. Further 
emphasizing the power of a state 'to set the limits of per-
missible contest open to industrial combatants' the Court 
cited with approval the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, at 488 
[ 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349]. On that page the opinion stated: 
'The conditions developed in industry may be such that those 
engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger 
to the community. But it is not for judges to determine 
whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set 
the limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties 
which the new situation demands. This is the function of 
the legislature which, while limiting individual and group 
rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of 
justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.' 
''After emphasizing state power over industrial conflicts, 
the Court in the Thornhill opinion went on to say, at p. 104, 
that ~tates may not 'in dealing with the evils arising from 
industrial disputes . . . impair the effective exercise of the 
right to discuss freely industrial relations .... ' 'l'his state-
ment must be considered in its context. It was directed towan1 
a sweeping state prohibition which this Court found to em-
brace 'nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those 
interested-including the employees directly affected-ma)· 
enlighten the public Oil the uature and causes of a labor dis-
pute.' ... 
''A ppellaHt::; al,;o rely on Carpenters & J. Union v. Rittm·'s 
Cafe, :nil U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 l.J.Ed. 1143], and Bakery 
& P. Dn'vers & Helpers, I.B.T. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 [62 
S. Ct. 8] 6, 86 L.Ed. 1178], decided the same day. Neither 
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lends support to the contention that peaceful picketing is be-
yond legislative control. The Court's opinion in the Ritter 
case approvingly quoted a part of the Thornhill opinion which 
recognized broad state powers over industrial conflicts. In 
the Wohl case, the Court's opinion at p. 775 found no 'violence, 
force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppres-
sive' and said that 'A state is not required to tolerate in all 
places ... even peaceful picketing by an individual.' A 
concurring opinion in the W ohl case, at pp. 776-777, pointed 
out that picketing may include conduct other than speech, 
conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legis-
lation. No opinions relied on by petitioners assert a constitu-
tional right in picketers to take advantage of speech or press 
to violate valid laws designed to protect important interests 
of society." (Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 
490, 498 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834] .) 
The Giboney case was followed by Hughes v. Sttperior Con?"f, 
339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985], where the Cali-
fornia court was upheld in enjoining Negroes from pieketing 
a store to enforce a demand that it hire a proportionate num-
ber of Negroes on the ground that it was picketing to compel 
raeial discrimination, which was against the court declared 
public policy of the state. Four justices agreed with the 
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter and Justices Black, 
Minton and Reed concurred on the ground the case was con-
trolled by the Giboney case. .Justice Douglas did not par-
ticipate. It was again pointed out that picketing is not free 
from any restraint even though having aspects of communi-
cation, stressing its coercive features. 
Next came Building Service Emp. Intl. Union v. Ga.zzam, 
339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 hEd. 1045]. There in a suit 
for damages by a hotel owner employer, the employer had 
refused to sign a closed shop contract with a union because 
his employees at an election had declined to join the union, 
and for him to sign would violate a Washington statutory 
policy forbidding him to coerce his employees' choice of rep-
resentative. Peaceful picketing followed and the Washington 
court gave damages and injunctive relief. The Supreme 
Court of the United States affirmed, holding that there was 
no violation of the free speech guaranty. After pointing ont 
that picketing may be restricted, the court said: "The pnblie 
policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, aets of 
the legislature, and decisions of its courts. 'Primarily it is for 
the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State.' . . . 
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''The State of Washington has by legislative enactment 
rleclared its public policy on the subject of organization of 
workers for bargaining purposes. . . . Under the so-enunci-
ated public policy of Washington, it is clear that workers 
shall be free to join or not to join a union, and that they 
shall be free from the coercion, interference, or restraint of 
mnployers of labor in the designation of their representatives 
for collective bargaining. Picketing of an employer to com-
pel him to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining repre-
sentative is an attempt to induce a transgression of this pol-
icy, and the State here restrained the advocates of such 
transgression from further action with like aim. To judge 
the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is but to deter-
mine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on the policy 
is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected from 
state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
''. . . An adequate basis for the instant decree is the 
unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the 
employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining repre-
sentative." (Building Service Emp. Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 
supra, 339 U.S. 532, 537.) 
In International B1·o. of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, supra, 
339 U.S. 4 70, the peaceful picketing by one picket was aimed 
at a person in the automobile repair business without em-
ployees because he kept open at times that were proscribed 
by agreement between the union and an association of em-
ployers engaged in the same business. The banner of the 
picket merely said "Union People Look for the Union Shop 
Card." The injunction was upheld in an opinion written 
by Justice Frankfurter, concurred in by three justices. Jus-
tice Clark concurred in the result. 'l'hree justices dissented. 
,Justice Frankfurter said: ''Our decisions reflect recognition 
that picketing is 'indeed a hybrid.' . . . The effort in the 
cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional 
protection of the element of communication in picketing and 
'the power of the State to set the limits of permissible con-
test open to industrial combatants.' ... A State's judgment 
on striking such a balance is of course subject to the limita-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Embracing as such a 
judgment does, however, a State's social and economic poli-
cieH, which in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of 
local social and economic factors, such judgment on these 
matters comes to this Court bearing a weighty title of re-
spect. 
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'r. 'fhesl~ two cases emphasize the nature of a problem that 
is presented by our duty of sitting in judgment on a State's 
judgment in striking the balance that has to be struek when 
a State decides not to keep hands off these industrial con-
tests. Here we have a glaring instance of the interplay of 
competing social-economic interests and viewpoints. Unions 
obviously are concerned not to have union standards under-
mined by non-union shops. 'l'his interest penetrates into self-
employer shops. On the other hand, some of our profoundest 
thinkers from Jefferson to Brandeis have stressed the im-
portance to a democratic society of encouraging self-employer 
economic units as a counter-movement to what are deemed 
to be the dangers inherent in excessive concentration of eco-
nomic power." (International Bro. of Teamsters Union v. 
Hanke, supra, 339 U.S. 470, 474.) 
International Brotherhood v. National Labor Rel. Board, 
341 U.S. 694 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299], held that picket-
ing in aid of a secondary boycott which was proscribed by 
statute could be prevented. 
[9] Those cases and the discussion therein leave no doubt 
as to the validity of the instant act. It is not vague or un-
certain as was the act in In re Blaney, supra. It is no more 
subject to attack than the broad language used in the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 dealing with secondary 
boycott. In upholding this act the Supreme Court said: ''The 
prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary 
pressure by§ 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridg-
ment of free speech. The inducement or encouragement in 
the instant case took the form of picketing followed by a tele-
phone call emphasizing its purpose. The constitutionality of 
§ 8(b) (4) (A) is here questioned only as to its possible rela-
tion to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. This provision has been sustained by several Courts 
of Appeals. The substantive evil condemned by Congress 
in § 8 (b) ( 4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have 
recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe pick-
eting in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There 
is no reason why Congress may not do likewise. 
"Petitioners object to the breadth of the Board's order 
as stated in 82 N.L.R.B. at 1030, supra, 341 U.S. 698-699, 71 
S.Ct. 957. They contend that its language prohibits induce-
ment not only of employees of Deltorto but also the induce-
ment of employees of any other employer to strike, where 
an object thereof is to force Giorgi or any other employer 
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or person to cease doing business with Langer. To confine 
the order solely to secondary pressure through Giorgi or 
Deltorto would leave Langer and other employers who do 
business with him exposed to the same type of pressure 
through other comparable channels. The order properly en-
joins petitioners from exerting this pressure upon Langer, 
through other employers, as well as through Giorgi and Del-
torto. We may well apply here the principle stated in Inter--
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 [68 
S.Ct. 12, 17, 92 L.Ed. 20]: 'When the purpose to restrain 
trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary 
that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and 
that only the worn one be closed.' " (International Brother-
hood v. National Labor Rel. Board, supra, 341 U.S. 694, 
705.) The ,Jurisdictional Strike Law here involved specifi-
cally provides that a concerted refusal to work or concerted 
interference with an employer's business is against public 
policy when it arises out of a dispute between two labor or-
ganizations as to which should have the exclusive right to 
bargain collectively. Hence an activity such as picketing 
to achieve unlawful ends, refusal to work or interference 
with the employer's business when the dispute is between two 
organizations seeking exclusive rights, is banned. Wisely or 
unwisely the Legislature has declared the policy of this state 
that an employer's business shall not be interfered with or 
the public welfare disrupted by reason of an argument be-
tween two or more unions as to which shall be chosen to 
represent his employees, a matter which may hinge largely on 
the respective claims of the quality of representation. The 
act eliminates the situation where the labor organization is 
employer controlled, hence an independent union is not pre-
vented from endeavoring to organize an employer's employeps 
when they belong to an employer controllerl union or no union. 
'Whatever may have been the rnle before the recent rlecisions 
of the Uniterl States SuprPmP Court, supra, we have the ad 
which declares the public pol iry of this state and those eases 
establish its validity. 
Judgment reversed. 
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, .J., TraynQr, .J., 
Schauer, .T., and Spence, .T., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 
1953. 
